点评俄军在乌东部作战的表现（2022-05-30）

本文翻译自推特上，作者 Mick Ryan, AM @warinthefuture 
点评了俄乌战争中的俄军近期表现(2022-5月底)。我只是翻译他的文章，不支持也不反对他的观点。


俄乌局势图（近期）

原文链接：https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1531066969834721280

<以下为正文>
俄罗斯入侵乌克兰95天了，我一直在探索适应性变化及军事机构如何在战争中学习。今天我研究了最近二周俄军在顿马斯展示是他们如何从战争实践中学习适应的。
In the 95 days since Russia invaded

迈克尔·豪伍德爵士在《使用和滥用军队的历史》中写道：军事机构正常都会下一场战争中出错，大多数都是他们的无法控制的原因。这样，军事机构的一个重要品德是必须适应意外事件。
2/ Sir Michael Howard wrote in “The Uses and Abuses of Military History” that military institutions normally get the next war wrong, mostly for reasons beyond their control. As such, an important virtue for military organizations must be adaptability to unexpected events.

三月份，我就探索在战争中适应性的概念，以及俄军2008年开始转型努力显示他们在战术和战略层面得到的回报很少。
3/ In March I explored the concept of adaptation in war, as well as how Russian transformation efforts since 2008 appear to have paid minimal dividends for them at the tactical & strategic levels. 

过去几周中，俄军在顿巴斯东部的防守有了缓慢且稳定的进步。俄军的优势是显示从之前的失败中学习。
4/ In the last few weeks, the Russians have made steady, if slow, progress in the conduct of its eastern offensive in the Donbas. The Russian advances is an indication that they are learning from their earlier failures. 

在具体探索这个问题前，有必要为探索俄军从哪里学习东西先定义一个框架。我会运用一些战争的主要原理。
5/ Before exploring this in detail, a short detour is necessary to define a framework for exploring where the Russians have learned. I will use some of the principles of war.

军队组织运用这些原理指导指战员，制定一般的战术及组织战斗和支援编队。這些原則是代表戰爭胜利、軍事行動和行動實踐的基本真理的格言。
6/ Military organisations use these principles to instruct soldiers, develop common tactics, and to organise combat & support formations. The principles are, in effect, maxims that represent essential truths about the practice of successful wars, military campaigns & operations. 

在这篇俄军学习适用性中，有3个战争的原理脱颖而出：选择、维持目的，集中兵力，协同作战。
7/ In the context of this exploration of Russian learning, three principles of war in particular stand out. These are: selection and maintenance of the aim; concentration of force; and cooperation.

任何一次军事行动，出兵目的必须简单，被现有参战部队广泛理解。最初俄军的作战目的太宽泛，且没有算到西方会大量援助乌克兰。
8/ In any military action, the aim must be simple, widely understood and within the means of the forces available. The initial Russian war aims were broad ranging and did not count on massive western military aid to Ukraine.

后来就清楚了，这些目的超出了俄军的能力。俄罗斯动用的侵略军队要比被入侵国的军队少，它就失败了。
9/ It quickly became clear that these aims were beyond Russian military capacity. The Russians were using an invading military that was smaller than that of the state it was attacking, and it failed.

最近，正如被高层官员指出的那样，俄军在东部缩小了在乌东的作战目的—-他们调换了军队并且给他们一个更好的机会来实现更加强硬的战略目标。
10/ More recently, the Russians – as highlighted in briefings by senior Russian officers – have consolidated their aims to narrower objectives in the east. And they have shifted their forces to give themselves a better chance at achieving these tighter strategic goals.

集中兵力。大多数时候和地点，战争胜利依靠于集中兵力。这些可以得到信息行动和外交努力的运动来放大集中兵力的影响。
11/ Concentration of effort. Success in war often depends on achieving a concentration of military force at the most time and place. This should then be supported by efforts such as information operations & diplomacy to magnify the impact of the concentrated military forces.

最初几周战争中，俄军希望在地面从四个方向对乌克兰进攻：北部，东北，东部和南部。另一个方向是空中和导弹对乌攻击。
12/ In the first weeks of the war, the Russians sought to prosecute their war against Ukraine on four ground fronts in the north, northeast, east and south of the country. Another front was the clearly disconnected air and missile attacks against Ukraine.

因为基辅和哈尔科夫的失利，俄军只好重新评估这个方案。1，他们重新布置了兵力，这样需要支持的前线就少了。2，俄军可以在乌克兰一处重点防守。
13/ Because of the failures around Kyiv & Kharkiv, the Russians have had to reassess this approach. 1st, they realigned the deployment of their forces, so they had fewer ‘fronts’ to support. 2nd, the Russians have focussed their offensive operations in one part of Ukraine.

俄军利用这种集中兵力去重点打击乌军防守，摧毁军事单位和人口中心及顺带抢占地盘。
14/ The Russians are using this concentration of combat forces to bludgeon their way through Ukrainian defences, destroy military units and population centres, and to capture additional territory.

但从其它地方抽调兵力集中到东部，这导致俄军其它地方显得薄弱。乌军可以在科尔松地方发起反击。
15/ But in stripping forces from other regions, and focussing on the east, it has made the Russians vulnerable elsewhere. The Ukrainians have thus launched a counteroffensive around Kherson.

最后一个原则是协同作战。战争早期，很明显，俄罗斯陆军和空军协同作战很差。同时，俄军地面部队表现得不能有效组合各军种。
16/ A final principle of war is cooperation. Early in the war, it was clear that the Russian Army and the Russian Air Force were poorly aligned. At the same time, the Russians showed an inability to effectively use combined arms operations on the ground.

俄军在东部的运作已证明在这方面有了一定的学习，俄空军的出动架次有了提高，集中精力配合东部的地面作战。
17/ The operations in the east demonstrate a degree of learning in this regard. The Russian air force sortie rate has improved, and it is concentrating much of its efforts to support ground operations in the east.

同时，俄地面部队的协同作战也有了改善。他们利用炮兵的优势，进攻得慢且小心，以免后勤线遭到在北部战场上那样的攻击。
18/ At the same time, the coordination of Russian ground forces has improved. They have moved slowly and cautiously, used their advantage in artillery well, and have been careful not to expose their logistics to attack to the degree they did in the north.

在高层，俄军任命了一个高级将军掌控乌克兰全局战事。他监督了东部战争残酷和破坏性的做法，但俄军可能将他们有限的胜利当用重大成功。
19/ And at the higher level, the Russians have appointed a senior Russian general as the overall commander of the Ukrainian campaign. He has overseen a brutal and destructive approach in the east, but the Russians are likely to see their limited gains as major successes.

但是维持可以产生作战优势的战术学习将对其它俄军领导力不足带来显著挑战，是不是太少，太迟了？
20/ But sustaining tactical learning to generate an operational advantage will be a significant challenge given other Russian leadership shortfalls. And is it too little, too late?

这产生了一个大的问题：俄军的战术性学习对整个战争进展的影响是什么？随着东部战事的激烈，在接下来几周中，他们能保持防守能力吗？
21/ This begs a larger question: what might be the impact of this Russian tactical learning be on the overall conduct of the war? And given the intensity of Russia’s eastern operations, will they remain capable of offensive operations after the next few weeks?

这依赖于俄军的后勤，乌军的防御策略，西方援助的流入和乌军在其它地方的反击拖住俄军。短期的战略适应性（尽管难）要比长期的战备适应性要简单多了。
22/ This depends on Russian logistics, Ukrainian defensive strategy, the inflow of western aid, and the conduct of Ukrainian offensives elsewhere that might draw away Russian forces. And short-term tactical adaptation (though hard) is simpler than long term strategic adaptation.

Murray, Knox and Bernstein写道：在政治和战略层面做出正确的决定要比战术层面更重要。在运作和战术层面的错误可以被纠正，但政治和战略的错误会永远存在。
23/ Murray, Knox and Bernstein have written “it is more important to make correct decisions at the political & strategic level than at the tactical level. Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but political and strategic mistakes live forever.”

俄军已经证明了他们有能力从战术失败中学习。但是国家层面的学习和适应经济的、外交的、信息的及入侵略乌克兰错误战略的其它影响有待观察。这可能会拖延这一场战争了。
24/ Russia has demonstrated some capacity to learn from its tactical failures. But its national ability learn & adapt to the economic, diplomatic, informational and other impacts of its flawed strategy to invade Ukraine remains to be seen. This will probably prolong the war.

感谢……我在这个推链中使用了他们的照片。
25/ Thanks to   @IAPonomarenko  @UAweapons @HN_Schlottman @michaelh992 @RALee85 @War_mapper
http://washingtonpost.com
&
http://nytimes.com
whose images I used in this thread.